Introduction
Operational Risk (OR) Management has developed rapidly in recent years. There are two main reasons for this. One is external; to comply with banking regulations (the Basel II Accord came into effect in 2007) and the other is internal; most banks are realising that good OR management is a sound business practice. The influence of regulatory compliance is currently the greater of the two and, consequently, banks are mainly concerned with ensuring that their OR-capital models are approved by banking regulators, focusing on a "macro", or top level. It is envisaged that after banks have achieved their first aim of capital computation, their attention will turn to managing OR at the "micro" or business unit level, because that is where operational losses occur. This paper outlines the steps taken to construct a specific OR management tool at the business unit level, namely the foreign exchange (FX) settlement process in a bank.
A Bayesian Network for Foreign Exchange Settlement
A Bayesian Network (BN), i.e. a probabilistic graphical model, was used to represent the components of the settlement process, the associated risks and their causal factors, and their probabilistic dependencies. The construction of the BN begins with risk and process mapping, i.e. the identification of risk factors and the dependencies between them. This iterative process, done in collaboration with business unit managers and risk experts responsible for FX settlement, involves breaking down the processes into sub-processes and outlining the activities involved in each sub-process. The potential risks associated with each activity in each sub-process are considered, and the factors that might drive each risk are identified.
The FX process flow comprises a number of sequential steps: pre-trade preparation, trade capture, confirmation, netting, settlement and nostro reconciliation. This case study covered four of these sub-processes, namely trade capture through to settlement and, within these, emphasis was placed on confirmation and settlement, which were of specific interest to the settlement department. A foreign exchange transaction can be considered to have settled correctly or failed. Failure here includes delays, incorrect payments, misdirected payments, non-payments and duplicate payments. The risk factors associated with the frequency and severity of failure, which were dealt with separately, are listed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively; the corresponding BNs are shown in Figures 1 and 2 . The frequency of failure, which was modelled by a Poisson distribution, depends directly on the quality of the settlement instructions (SI), the payment input method and on a variety of additional factors which constitute the node "vulnerability". These three factors also depend on other factors in a multi-level fashion as shown in Figure 1 . Although the Poisson distribution depends on a single parameter, this was estimated by combining two elicited quantities, the mean and the 95% percentile of the distribution. The loss severity depends directly on the three factors listed in Table 2 . The trade value distribution for each interest rate regime could be estimated from historical data; we used non-parametric density estimators for this. The conditional probability distribution of "days delayed" given trade value was elicited. It is assumed that the risk of failure and the severity are independently distributed. Of course a BN network should not be regarded as static; the network needs to be regularly "maintained", i.e. the parameters need to be regularly updated. 
Elicitation protocol and Calibration
The choice of BN was motivated by the insufficiency and the backward-looking nature of historical loss data, secondly, by the multi-level dependencies among the risk or causal factors, and lastly, by the long-term aim of using the model to improve the current process and thereby reduce OR. Changes in the process can render historical data, based on past practices, irrelevant. Thus, although historical data were used for validation of the model, calibration was mainly based on the estimates of experts. The entire elicitation process comprised six two-hour interviews, each focusing on one section of the two networks. An important issue is to anticipate and mitigate some of the potential biases that can occur. Expert elicitation was carried out by means of a composite protocol; a combination of elements of the Stanford/SRI, Wallsten/EPA protocols (see, e.g. Morgan and Henrion, 1990) , and that of Cooke and Goosens (2000) . The essential elements are as follows:
• Formulation of the quantities of interest.
• Identification and selection of experts for both the pilot run and the real run.
• Preparation of documents -outlining the objective of the process, -describing the cognitive heuristics, biases and other relevant issues, (Read by the experts prior to elicitation.) -formulating the questions and format of the elicitation document.
• Pilot run, and subsequent improvement of elicitation document.
• Expert training, covering the elicitation technique, the quantities of interest, potential sources of bias, etc.
• Expert elicitation sessions.
• Feedback session with the experts and documentation of the results. Guo and Hsu (2002) give a survey of exact and approximate inference algorithms that have been proposed for BNs; a "junction tree" algorithm (see, e.g., Shacter et al., 1990) was applied. The two BNs, for (weekly) frequency and severity of failure are displayed in Figures 1 and 2 respectively, together with some of the associated posterior probabilities. 
Validation and Applications
The BNs for both frequency and severity of loss were based almost entirely on elicited information. Exceptions were the use of data on trade values and interest rates. Direct checks on the model were carried out using actual historical loss data available. The frequency distribution generated by the BN had a (slightly) larger mean than that observed. A contributing factor to this apparent bias is the fact that "small losses" had not been recorded. The non-recording of small losses also complicated validation of the severity distribution but, even correcting for this, the loss severity distribution generated by the model has a fatter tail than the distribution of the observed losses. Of course it is possible that the experts erred on the side of caution in their assessments that were entered in the BN. The occurence of even a small number of large losses would substantially alter the properties of the empirical distribution. Evidently such losses had not occurred during the observation period but, according to the experts, large losses are possible, albeit improbable. This is in essence what OR is about -managing large improbable but possible losses. Of course it would also be possible to recalibrate the BN in the light of these data. The model developed here can be used to estimate the approximate OR Value at Risk for the FX settlement process. This is achieved by aggregating the terminal node of the frequency network (failed settlement) and that of the severity network (loss severity) through Monte-Carlo simulation methods. However, the model is likely to be more useful for the management of OR. Simply by participating in the construction of a BN sensitises management to the risk factors in the system and the ways in which these lead to failures. BNs also enable scenario and sensitivity analyses, which can reveal the types of changes and interventions that would reduce OR. In scenario analysis, by fixing the value of one or more variables and updating the probabilities in the BN, it is possible to estimate the changes to the loss distribution that would result from a specific intervention, e.g. an additional check. It is also easy to assess the sensitivity of the results and conclusions to small changes in the parameter values. In this case study it turned out that the target node "frequency of failure" in the frequency BN was sensitive to changes in the node "quality of SI"; whereas in the severity BN the target node was most sensitive to the parameters in the "days delay" node.
